

442 PLUTARCH A WTHKIST,
OR

he often condemns them»Jbiit
uncertainly, **f*onw**»

times as **such**, who assigned no cause
at all of evils, and sometimes again as
those, who mack* God the cause of
them. For *hi* his **P\$ychaprQ*i*?** **he**
concludes, that unless we acknowledge
a substantial **evil** principle, •«** **SroiJtot**
tJjLtac aTTOftac, ra jcaicov *ik* ton ;t»t avroc awurwc
JC«« T^C iirfttwyovrtCj **"fc r&wyi wran* own TO
ayadotty wri ft! airoiotr, ctjcoc €<mv ow/av
Jtaicoti K«I yivimv tr«f«ff)(ity* Tilt*

Stoical difficulties will of necessity
overtake¹ and

Involve us, who introduce evil **into the**
world **from**
nothing, or without a cause,
neither

that

which is **essentially** good (an **God**),
nor yet that which is **devoid of all**
quality (as matter), **could** possibly give
being or **generation to** it,—But in his
book against the Stoics,¹¹ he **accuse****
tlirtii a^ , those, who made **God**,
essentially good, the caunc*

of evil. **Avroi ri}v KaKwv ap)(9tf** *uja&w*
*tevfti TC*I**

cy ou yop 17 vXif TO icaicop t£ avr^ wci|il0)(iKii»f ^
iori icai rcwrac wac SI)(fT<ii 8ia^0p«cf v*0 T«H
irocovirroc itcit <j^i7juart2[«vroc «(y)(»f*c*v* ciwri
iti*«yicf| r*i jcnicov, S* oil?ii% **4K rou/<«/ OITOC» « ?***
An r»;v *;ivi*i«r«»«oyin' «V ro5 Ocov yiyoiw; Jff<i|
>)(iiF% llietlisel VCS Itiaki* **God**
being good the principle and **of evil**,
sine*?

matter, which is devoid of quality, **and**
receives nit

its differences from the active
principle* that

and forms it, could not possibly be
the

thereof. Wherefore, evil **must** of
iiece«sityf eitlier

come from **nothing/or** **it must**
come from thr
active and **moving principle, which is**

God.—Now
from all these **premise* joined**

Plutarch
concludes, that **the phenomenon of**
evil rould 110 otherwise possibly be
solved, than by **M!p{K>fiitig a**
substantial principle for **it, and a**
wrlatu irra-

» P. 10I&. torn. ti. <!jM»r, »» !>. i<f?(j.
twin, li, e